EU trade mark dispute: Obelix - EU trade mark dispute: K*

EU trade mark dispute: Obelix

On 13 May 2026, in case T-24/25, the General Court examined a trade mark dispute concerning the word mark Obelix. The dispute was brought by Les Éditions Albert René, publisher of the Astérix & Obélix series, after the sign Obelix had been registered for goods such as weapons, ammunition and explosives.

In September 2020, the Polish company WORKS 11 Michał Lubiński applied for the contested mark (no. 018304227), covering goods in Class 13, including firearms, hand grenades, machine guns, military rifles, weapon cases, cartridges, tanks, howitzers, pistols, and military pyrotechnics. However, Les Éditions Albert René filed an application for a declaration of invalidity before EUIPO. The publisher relied on its earlier EU word mark OBELIX (no. 000016154), which covers goods and services including books, printed matter, clothing, games, toys, entertainment, film production, and publishing services.

In the first instance, EUIPO rejected the request for invalidity. The Cancellation Division found that there was insufficient evidence to prove the genuine use of the earlier OBELIX mark. The Board of Appeal later dismissed the appeal. While it assumed that the earlier mark had been used in good faith, it noted that there was no likelihood of confusion because the goods and services were different. Furthermore, it considered that the evidence did not permit a clear conclusion regarding the reputation of the earlier mark, nor did it suggest that the public would establish a link between 'Obelix' and the earlier 'OBELIX' mark.

The evidence submitted by Les Éditions Albert René included references to Obelix on Wikipedia and the publisher's website, as well as photographs and samples of products based on the character. It also included licensing agreements, sales figures, examples of products offered online, and material concerning the wider Astérix & Obélix franchise. However, EUIPO considered that this mainly demonstrated the popularity of the comic book series and the character, rather than the reputation of OBELIX as a trade mark.

At the General Court, the case centred primarily on Article 8(5) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation. This provision provides broader protection for well-known trade marks, even when the goods or services are not similar. The issue was not whether consumers would assume that the weapons were produced by the publisher of Asterix & Obelix, but whether the later mark could create an association with the earlier OBELIX mark and affect its value or image.

First, the General Court stated that EUIPO had examined the evidence too narrowly. In particular, the Court pointed out that EUIPO had not given proper consideration to examples where “Obelix” or “Obélix” appeared with the ® symbol. In the Court's view, this could indicate that the term was being used as a registered trade mark, rather than just as the name of a fictional character.

In addition, the Court rejected the idea that evidence could be excluded simply because Obelix appeared alongside Asterix. EU trade mark law does not require a trade mark owner to prove that a mark has always been used on its own. Two signs can be used together while retaining their separate trademark function.

Moreover, the General Court considered that EUIPO had not adequately evaluated the potential connection between the signs. EUIPO had focused mainly on the differences between the goods and the relevant consumers. Clearly, weapons and explosives are far removed from books, games, clothing, and entertainment services. However, other factors also had to be considered, such as the signs being identical, the possible reputation of the earlier mark, and OBELIX's distinctive character.

Therefore, the Court annulled the EUIPO decision. However, it did not declare the later Obelix mark invalid, nor did it rule that the earlier OBELIX mark was well-known. EUIPO must now reassess the case.

EU trade mark dispute: K*

On 13 May 2026, in case T-105/25, the General Court examined a trade mark dispute between the Swedish fintech company Klarna Bank AB and the Spanish bank Kutxabank, SA. The case concerned Klarna’s application to register an EU figurative trade mark made up of a stylised letter K followed by a dot (no. 017099938).

The application covered services in Classes 35, 36, 39, 42 and 45. This included business services (Class 35), financial and payment services (Class 36), logistics services (Class 39), software and technology services (Class 42), and authentication and security services (Class 45). However, Kutxabank opposed the application on the basis of two earlier EU figurative trade marks. The first (no. 010514974) was a stylised lowercase 'k' registered for services in Class 36, including insurance, financial and monetary affairs. The second (no. 011264421) was a figurative mark containing a stylised 'k' together with the words 'kutxabank kredit', registered for services in Classes 35 and 36.

At first, the EUIPO Opposition Division upheld the opposition for all the services covered by Klarna’s application. Klarna appealed against this decision. The EUIPO Board of Appeal then partially overturned the Opposition Division’s decision. The Board found that the opposition should succeed for the services in Class 36, but not for those in Classes 35, 39, 42 and 45.

Both companies challenged that decision before the General Court. Kutxabank argued that the opposition should also have been upheld for services outside of Class 36. Klarna, however, argued that the opposition should also have been rejected for Class 36 services.

First, the Court assessed whether Klarna’s services outside Class 36 were similar to Kutxabank’s financial services. Kutxabank claimed that services such as invoicing, bookkeeping, payment software, credit assessment software, and user authentication for e-commerce transactions were closely related to financial matters. However, the Court rejected this argument. It reasoned that a service does not automatically become a financial service simply because it can be used in a financial context. Although software for electronic payments or credit assessment can support financial transactions, its nature, purpose and usual provider differ from those of financial and monetary services. The Court also noted that the services in Class 42 are mainly technology and software services, rather than banking services.

The Court came to the same conclusion regarding Class 45 services. Authentication, security, and background investigation services are not of the same nature or purpose as insurance, financial, or monetary services. Furthermore, Kutxabank had not demonstrated that the relevant public would expect these services to be provided by the same entity. Furthermore, the Court rejected Kutxabank’s argument on complementarity. According to EU case law, services are considered complementary only if one is essential for the use of the other, to the extent that consumers might assume that the same company is responsible for both. A broad commercial link is not sufficient.

Regarding the earlier 'Kutxabank Kredit' trade mark, the court concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion. While both marks included the letter 'K', the earlier mark also contained the words 'kutxabank' and 'kredit'. These words were clearly visible and could not be ignored. Visually, the signs had only a low degree of similarity. Phonetically, they had at most a very low degree of similarity. Conceptually, they differed, as Kutxabank was likely to evoke the idea of a bank, whereas Klarna's single-letter sign did not convey a clear concept.

Nevertheless, the Court reached a different result for Kutxabank’s earlier stylised K mark in Class 36. The services were identical. Both signs consisted of a black, stylised K-type letter with dot elements. The Court considered that they were visually similar and phonetically identical, since both would be pronounced as the letter K.

Klarna argued that this would give Kutxabank a monopoly over the letter 'K', but the Court rejected this point. It stated that the finding of a likelihood of confusion did not protect the letter 'K' in isolation. Rather, it protects a specific combination of elements, considered alongside the identity of the services and the overall impression created by the signs. Therefore, the General Court confirmed the approach of the Board of Appeal. Klarna’s application for Class 36 services remains refused. However, the opposition was unsuccessful for the services in Classes 35, 39, 42 and 45.